I INTRODUCTION
A recent submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs said this about the Australian law of criminal procedure:
The recent law of criminal investigation is governed by a confusing "amalgam of common law, statutory law, court-directed practices and internal police regulations" .... A policeman's non-observance of [a citizen's rights] may lead to internal disciplinary procedures, but it does not constitute an offence nor give the suspect a cause of action [or, necessarily lead to exclusion of the evidence].' Several months of studying the law of criminal investigation in Australia have led me to agree with this conclusion. It is the purpose of this article to discuss what that law is, but to do so in the only context that has any meaning in the real world of law enforcement. That is, in the context of remedies, specifically exclusionary remedies, for police misconduct. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, without a requirement that illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed, the constitutional prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" is no more than "a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of human liberties".
2 Thus, the Supreme Court, basing its decision in part on the fact that a majority of the states already had a mandatory exclusionary rule, 3 required all states to exclude evidence obtained as a result of police misconduct. A recent study has concluded that "the exclusionary rule has acted as a strong institutional deterrent prompting the [Chicago] police department, the State attorney's office, and the local narcotics courts to develop programs and procedures designed to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment". 4 It is irrelevant what judicial or statutory admonitions may be declared to govern the police. If these admonitions are not backed up by a consistently applied system of remedies for non-compliance, then they are nothing but
A General Observations
Australia does have a considerable body of law relating to evidentiary exclusion due to irregularities in the conduct of an investigation by the authorities.10 However, it is not so well developed that it could be considered an 'exclusionary rule'. That is, as previously mentioned, the police have no particular expectation that if they break the rules, the evidence will be lost. Such exclusion does sometimes occur but, as the Australian Law Reform Commission observed in 1975, if unlawfully obtained evidence "is relevant it is almost invariably admitted into evidence"." As a result of later court decisions, a more recent commentator has been a bit more positive about the situation, 12 but it still seems to be the case, as the Lucas Report observed, that Australian police are, in general, "undisturbed " 13 by fear of evidentiary exclusion, or any other remedy 4 for rights violations. The notion that "it matters not how you get [evidence] ; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence," 5 reflects the British common law. 16 However, in Bunning v Cross 7 a majority of the High Court made it clear that Australian law had broken from the British law and now concerned itself with "the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct of [police]".' 8 This point, as the New South Wales Law Reform Commission observed in 1979, and as is still true 10 Thus the Australian position offers some further disproof of the belief of American conservatives, as expressed by former Chief Justice Burger that the exclusionary rule is "unique to American jurisprudence": Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 403 US 388, 415 (1971) per Burger CJ, dissenting. I have previously punctured this claim in C M Bradley, "The Exclusionary Rule in Germany" (1983) 96 Harv L Rev 1032. Canada has also recently adopted a rule of evidentiary exclusion due to police misconduct. LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, para 210. 12 E Johnston, "The Exclusionary Rule and Other Controls Over the Abuse of Power by Police" (1980) 54 ALl 466, 467: " [lI] t is the strong impression of this writer that over recent years there has, at least in some jurisdictions, been a greater readiness on the part of judges to exercise their discretion against admission". 13 The Lucas Report, supra n 6, 91. 14 The other major legal sanctions are civil suits and non-public police disciplinary procedures.
These sanctions are "notoriously least effective in the area of interrogation of suspects and the gathering of evidence in relation to crime": E Johnston, supra n 12, 466. "The weaknesses of these remedies . . . are such that if continued in their present form they would render irrelevant, in terms of their practical effect [any reform of the rules of criminal procedure]": LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, paras 210, 258-260. The reason that internal disciplinary procedures don't work is simple: these procedures punish bad police work. Without an exclusionary rule, police practices that are aggressive and obtain evidence by infringing on civil rights are not considered 'bad police work' by police review boards. Only if evidence obtained in this way is rendered unavailable to the prosecution's case do such practices become 'bad'. See M W Orfield, Jr, supra n 4, explaining how this works in Chicago. a decade later, has not been fully grasped by the Australian legal profession and judiciary. 19
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B Mandatory Exclusion
The first basis for evidentiary exclusion is the long established common law rule, based on concerns of reliability, that statements that have not been voluntarily given must be suppressed. This rule was summarised in 1948 by Dixon J in McDermott v R:
If he [the accused] speaks because he is overborne his confessional statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne. If the statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue insistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary. It is also a definite rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be voluntary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in authority and the inducement has not been removed before the statement was made.
20
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show, on the 'balance of probability', that the statement was voluntary. 21 Despite frequent mention of this rule in High Court decisions, it has rarely been invoked. 22 There is no other mandatory rule of exclusion generally applicable in Australia.
In New South Wales, however, there is a statutory requirement that, in addition to the above-stated rules, no confession may be received into evidence if it has been induced by any "untrue representation", made to the defendant by the authorities. 23 In addition, in two Queensland cases, confessions were suppressed on the ground that the police had offered the suspect an 'inducement' to confess. In R v Plotzki [1972] Qd R 379 the Court of Criminal Appeals disallowed a confession made after the police suggested that the suspect would not be charged with a crime if he confessed. In R v Beere [1965] Qd R 370 the Queensland Supreme Court disallowed a confession simply because the police had intimated to the suspect "that it would in some way be beneficial for her to tell the truth": ibid 37 1. See also, Waight and Williams, ibid 736-40 discussing other Commonwealth cases where evidence has been suppressed on this ground. 23 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 410(l)(a) and (b).
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inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made". 24 The New South Wales provision goes beyond any requirement imposed by the United States Supreme Court. That Court has never directly considered the issue but it did, in one case, approve on other grounds the use of a confession that was induced by the police telling the suspect, falsely, that his fingerprints had been found at the crime scene. 25 However, the New South Wales courts have not ever actually excluded a confession pursuant to this section 26 in a reported decision, and have limited it to knowingly untrue statements by the police, made with the object of obtaining a confession from the suspect.
27
C Discretionary Exclusion
Beyond the 'involuntariness' basis for exclusion, there are three other possible grounds, all of which lie in the discretion of the trial judge (who is at least obliged to consider whether that discretion should be exercised).
(1) Prejudicial Impact
The first of these is self evident. It is that "a confession (and indeed any evidence tendered by the prosecution) can be rejected when its probative value is low and its prejudicial effect is high". 29 I could find no reported instance of this discretion ever having been exercised, presumably because the probative value of a confession is almost invariably high.
(2) Unreliability
The second ground for discretion is that a confession, though not involuntary, may le excluded, if "it would be unfair to use it in evidence 24 Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), s 149. This provision has been read narrowly by the High Court in R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 which held that it was strictly limited to 'confessions' rather than other statements by the accused which might prove useful to the prosecution. And, it is limited to cases where the "common law would have rejected the confession as nonvoluntary on the sole ground that it was induced by such a threat or promise, not to cases in which the common law would have rejected it as non-voluntary on any other ground", This head of discretion would not apply to the finding of real evidence which could not be rendered unreliable by the means by which it was obtained.
34
While court opinions refer to this discretion with relative frequency, 35 I was however able to discover only two cases, both of lower courts, in which it was actually exercised.
In Klemenko v Huffa 36 a single judge of the South Australian Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for a summary offence of being in possession of stolen property on the ground that psychiatric testimony showed that he was insane at the time he gave his statement to the police and the magistrate had not considered whether or not to exercise his discretion.
3 7 In a study of all indictable cases that were concluded in the Sydney District Courts in a six week period there was, among the 147 cases, one (unreported) In Duke v R (1989) 83 ALR 650, Brennan J further elaborated on his view of the 'unfairness' discretion: "The unfairness against which an exercise of the discretion is intended to protect an accused may arise not only because the conduct of the preceding investigation has produced a confession which is unreliable but because no confession might have been made if the investigation had been properly conducted. If, by reason of the manner of the investigation, it is unfair to admit evidence of the confession, whether because the reliability of the confession has been made suspect or for any other reason, that evidence should be excluded. Trickery, misrepresentation, omission to inquire into material facts lest they be exculpatory, crossexamination going beyond the clarification of information voluntarily given, or detaining a suspect or keeping him in isolation without lawful justification -to name but some improprieties -may justify rejection of evidence of a confession if the impropriety had some material effect on the confessionalist" (at 653). In my view, this statement is not helpful as it tends to confuse the 'unfairness' (unreliability) head of discretion with the 'police misconduct' head of discretion, discussed infra text at nn 30-31. 
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heroin addict, who was "physically debilitated and under heavy medication" and exhibited a "very markedly clouded consciousness". 38 Contrariwise, in several cases, the courts, including the High Court, upheld the admission of a confession where it would have seemed that it should have been excluded due to the defendant's incapacity. In Basto v R 39 the confession was admitted despite the fact that the defendant was suffering from an overdose of drugs (which he had taken for the purpose of committing suicide) and later the same day was deemed to be insane. In R v Starecki o the defendant's statement had been taken after he had shot himself in the brain.
The American approach to the mentally unbalanced confessor has a different focus but will usually not allow use of the confession of an insane person. was capable of making a voluntary waiver of his right to silence and could be interrogated further by the police after receipt of Miranda warnings. This flies in the face of the Blackburn holding that "a most basic sense of justice is affronted by ... incarcerating a human being on the basis of a statement he made while insane": supra n 45, 207 (at least where, as in Blackburn, he is questioned while insane). 48 See eg, Wharton's Criminal Evidence (4th ed 1986) 643: "A confession is inadmissible if the accused was mentally or physically incapacitated at the time." (However, mental retardation, as opposed to insanity, does not automatically bar a confession but is a factor to be considered in its admissibility.)
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The final basis for discretionary exclusion of evidence in Australia is "when the evidence is the product of unfair or unlawful conduct on the part of the police". 49 However, unlike in America, where the mere failure to give the Miranda warnings or to obtain a search warrant when appropriate will automatically result in evidentiary exclusion, 5 0 in Australia the trial judge must weigh two competing requirements against each other: ". . . the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law." 5 ' In R v Ireland 52 the High Court held that photographs of the defendant's hands, taken without consent, to allow an expert witness to evaluate whether scratches on the hand were caused by the handling of a knife with a damaged handle, should have been excluded from the defendant's murder trial. In Ireland the policeman told the suspect that he "had to" have his hands photographed. 53 The court held that neither at common law nor under the relevant statutes' has a police officer power to require a person to submit himself to photography for any purpose other than identification, 55 and that the photographs should have been excluded in the exercise of the trial court's discretion.
6
As the High Court later made clear in Bunning v Cross, 57 this head of discretion by no means takes as its central point the question of unfairness to the accused. It is, on the contrary, concerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its part in the whole process of consideration.
58
These factors include regard for the "liberty of the subject"5 9 and concern that the government not "'play an ignoble part' ' 6 " in the conviction of criminals. Thus, the concerns of respect for privacy, concern for the purity 
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of the judicial process and deterrence of police misconduct all figure in the Australian, as they do in the American, exclusionary rule.
61
More specifically, the factors to consider include whether the "unlawful or improper conduct" 62 on the part of the police was intentional or reckless on the one hand or merely "accidental" or "unconscious" on the other; 63 "the ease with which the law might have been complied with"; 64 the nature of the offence charged 65 and whether there is evidence that the rule broken was one which reflected a "deliberate intent on the part of the legislature to narrowly restrict the police . . .". 66 The probative value of the evidence would be a factor to consider only in cases of a negligent police violation.
67
In Bunning, by a 4 to I majority, the High Court reversed the magistrate's exercise of discretion and held that evidence of a breathalyser test would be admissible in a drunk driving case despite the fact that it had been taken without reasonable suspicion and without performing a preliminary roadside test as required by the statute. 68 In R v Williams the High Court upheld the trial judge's exercise of discretion in excluding the confession of a burglary suspect who had been arrested at 6.00 am on one day and not taken to the magistrate until 10.00 am the following day. "If an arrested person is detained, not for the purpose of enabling him to be brought before a justice, but for the purpose of questioning him, the detention will be unlawful."6 9 However, the Court did not hold that evidence must be excluded in such circumstances; it simply declined to consider whether the trial judge had inappropriately exercised his discretion in excluding the evidence. and the taking of blood, hair, urine, voice, 7 2 and handwriting samples for the purpose of using the evidence thus discovered against him.
7 3 The Ireland decision seems strange, in view of the general reluctance of the Australian courts to exclude evidence. Given the experience of the ensuing nineteen years, it must be regarded as an aberration on its facts. 74 However, its basic recognition of the discretion to exclude real evidence due to police misconduct continues to be the law. 75 Similarly to Williams, the United States Supreme Court has, in Mallory v United States, 76 struck down a conviction on the ground that a seven hour delay (which resulted in a confession) in taking the defendant before a magistrate violated the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring such an appearance without "unnecessary delay".77 However, this decision has never been applied to the states through the Constitution and has been 'reversed' by Congress. 78 Unlike the Australian 'rules' of exclusion discussed earlier, the 'police misconduct' discretion is actually used from time to time, at least in confession cases, though not with any regularity or consistent logic. For example, the South Australian Supreme Court has been quite firm in enforcing an apparently "automatic discretionary exclusion "79 where the police continue to question the defendant after he has asserted either his right to silence or to counsel. 80 Queensland has a similar, though clearly not 'automatic' rule, 81 at least as to assertion of the right to counsel. However, as one commentator has observed, "in the reported cases where (confessional] evidence was not admitted, there was evidence which strongly corroborated the accused's story". 82 Thus these confessions may actually have been ordered excluded, not because of procedural irregularities, but because the courts believed that they were fabricated. 
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Federal Law Review
The High Court, while recognising the "clearly established judicial discretion" 83 to exclude evidence in such a case, has indicated that such exclusion is not mandatory. 84 In New South Wales, in the extraordinary case of R v Merritt and Roso 85 a confession was admitted into evidence despite the fact that the accused had given the police a written declaration, drawn up by his solicitor, stating that he would only answer questions in the presence of a lawyer. The court upheld the trial judge's admission of the confession on the ground that the defendant had failed to prove that his written declaration had come to the attention of the interviewing (as opposed to the arresting) officers. 86 The police claimed that it had not.
87
Defendant's further claim that after being cautioned and asked if he understood the caution he replied "No, and you can tell him [another officer] to stop writing", was also rejected on the ground that it was equivocal.
88
In America, the law on this issue is fairly clear. As is well known, before a defendant can be subjected to 'custodial interrogation' by the police he must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, that he has a right to counsel, and that if he can't afford counsel, one will be provided free of charge.
89 If the defendant indicates that he wishes to remain silent, questioning must cease. 90 
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Enforcing the Rules of Criminal Procedure provided. 9 ' Any statements made by the defendant after invocation of these rights (or if the warnings have not been given) must be excluded from evidence. 92 The fact that one policeman did not know that the defendant had asserted his rights to another policeman is irrelevant.
93
In addition to the 'assertion of rights' cases, the problem of holding defendants for the purpose of interrogation has attracted judicial attention in Australia. As discussed, in Williams 94 the High Court affirmed a trial court ruling that a confession should be excluded when obtained during an unnecessary delay in bringing the accused before a magistrate, enforcing a Tasmanian statute which reflected the common law requirement of such an appearance "as soon as practicable". 95 To the same effect was an earlier, unanimous, decision based on a Commonwealth statute, R v Iorlano. 96 A series of Victorian cases had similarly excluded confessional evidence based on s 460 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which required that arrestees be brought before a magistrate "as soon as practicable."
97 This led the Victorian Parliament to amend s 460 to provide that the police could hold a suspect for up to six hours, rather than presenting him "as soon as practicable" before the magistrate;
98 but recently, the statute has been changed again allowing the police to hold the defendant for a "reasonable time" before presenting him.
99
By the same token, some, but not all, Australian courts have held that the discretion to exclude evidence should be exercised when a confession is obtained from a defendant who is in illegal custody ab initio. 00 the grounds for exclusion of a confession, then so should custody that was illegal at its inception.' 0 ' Beyond these cases, Australian law exhibits only sporadic examples of evidentiary exclusion, usually by single state Supreme Court trial justices that can, in no sense, be considered to state a 'rule' that is generally applied by the courts of that state, much less the country. For example, in R v Soundry 0 2 the judge excluded a confession where the police had given "deliberately false answers" to solicitors who called the police to locate an accused. And, in the unusual case of R v Amad' 0 3 a confession was excluded on the ground that it was obtained by a mild 'cross-examination' of a suspect in custody. In Van der Meer the five Justices who decided the case unanimously condemned the police interrogation techniques, the majority describing them "rather bizarre"' 1 6 (though never flatly terming them illegal). Yet, by a 3 to 2 majority the court held that the trial judge had not misapplied the principles relevant to determine whether to exclude the suspects' admissions.
07
The disapproved procedures included confronting a suspect with the victims, and noting his responses to their accusations, the effect of which was "virtually to put [the suspect] on trial" at the police station.
08 Also, the police, during an interrogation that began about 10.00 am and continued sporadically until about midnight, engaged in conduct which Mason CJ described as "persistent confrontation of each [ [VOLUME 18
Enforcing the Rules of Criminal Procedure further brushed off the fact that, when one of the suspects [Ayliffe] finally was cautioned and asked if he was prepared to answer further questions he replied "No, not really", and "I'm not saying nothing". Despite this, he was encouraged to, and did, respond to what the police told him his fellow suspects had said."1 0 Oddly, none of the opinions discussed the Ireland (deterrence of police misconduct) discretion. The majority confined itself to the reliability issue and, concluding that the statements were reliable, admitted them."'
In R v Banner" 2 a suspect was arrested without reasonable suspicion, held incommunicado and interrogated by the police over a period of three days without being taken before a magistrate. The Victorian Supreme Court, while strongly condemning the police behaviour and declaring them "guilty ... of unlawful acts" and "possibly criminal conduct"" 3 nevertheless admitted his confession to murder into evidence." 1 4
In R v S and J115 the statutory requirement that arrestees be brought "forthwith" before a magistrate was avoided by the simple expedient of not formally arresting the sixteen year-old Aboriginal suspects until after "many hours" of interrogation. 116 The two suspects were taken separately to police headquarters and, though they were told they were "not under arrest", the police admitted that they would have arrested them had the suspects not agreed to go to the police station and "the suspects believed that that would be the result of non-compliance"."1
(4) No Exclusion due to Illegal Searches
While the Australian law as to exclusion of confessions on any of the grounds set forth by the High Court can charitably be described as erratic, it is at least apparent that courts are alive to the possibility that they can, through enforcement of exclusionary principles, put pressure on the police to follow the rules, if only there were more clearcut 'rules' to follow. In contrast to this is the total failure of Australian courts ever to exclude the fruits of an illegal search from evidence in a criminal trial. 18 Every state has statutory rules governing searches" 9 that are similar to the American rules and in numerous cases the courts have struck down warrants and ordered the evidence returned due to failure to set forth reasonable grounds in the application, and for overbreadth, etc. 20 However, these decisions do not necessarily preclude the police from proceeding with a prosecution and re- (1982) 30 SASR 578 the fact that the defendants were "detained without lawful authority" and believed that they were not free to go (one even had his overalls taken away by the police) was not sufficient to require exclusion of a confession: ibid 584. This, despite the court's conclusion that "the infringement of the appellant's legal rights was undoubtedly serious": ibid 585. To the same effect is R v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409: illegal delay in arraignment -no exclusion of confession. 118 "[A]s far as I am aware there has not been any significant or reported case in which evidence has been excluded because of the illegality of the means of its production. or vehicles reasonably suspected of "having or conveying any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence". The Search Warrant Act 1985 (NSW), ss 5 and 6 provides that search warrants may be issued on reasonable grounds for belief that there is, on any premises, "a thing connected with a particular [specified] offence" and that the warrant must specify the things to be searched. It further provides for the seizure of other evidence found on the premises (s 7), the search, on reasonable suspicion, of people found on the premises (s 8) and for telephonic warrants "in case of urgent need" (s 12). 
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obtaining the same evidence by subpoena.' 2 ' Moreover, all of these decisions are in warrant cases where the police are already making an effort to comply with the law. More in need of scrutiny are warrantless searches and seizures, but these appear to have largely escaped judicial notice. In one of the rare cases where this issue has been considered, in R v Tilev, 122 the police entered a flat without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion and found significant evidence of a murder. The trial judge, while recognising his discretion to exclude the evidence under Bunning v Cross, refused to do so on the ground that the police conduct, while illegal, was not "wholly outrageous". 23 Thus, despite the pronouncements of the High Court in Bunning v Cross, Australian courts still seem to reflect the British view that "the interests of the state must excuse the seizure of documents, which seizure would otherwise be unlawful, if it appears in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime committed by anyone".
2 4 Discussions with Australian defence attorneys who were keenly aware of police violations in the confessions area did not reveal much concern about illegal searches. 25 In part this could be explained by the high proportion of cases in which there is a confession -96 per cent in one study. 26 If the police can get a confession they will not feel as much need to search. Another explanation lies in the finding of the Law Reform Commission that "very many of the searches of premises undertaken by police officers are made ... at the 'invitation' or at least the consent of the occupier". 27 Still, given the large number of cases involving suppression of illegally seized evidence in America, despite the presence of a consent doctrine there as well, 28 it is inconceivable that there are not a significant number of cases involving evidentiary seizures by Australian police where the propriety of the search (or the existence or voluntariness of the consent) should at least be discussed. This impression is confirmed by two cases where the court's description of the police behaviour seemed to involve an illegal search, even though that issue was not discussed. In R v Narula 129 the court, in discussing whether a confession was admissible, mentions that the heroin was located by the police during a "surreptitious search" of a hotel room. Since no search warrant is mentioned, I presume this was the result of an illegal entry. 30 In another case, R v Kushkarian,' 31 the appellant was arrested for possession of a sawedoff shotgun (and later charged and convicted of armed robbery) after the shotgun "was found [by police] in the back of his motor vehicle".1 3 2 There is no discussion of how the police came to look in the back of his vehicle, which was parked at his home.
A particularly striking example of both the relative rarity of, but also the lack of concern in the Australian legal system for illegal searches is provided by the Beach Report. 33 There, twenty cases of gross violations of individual rights by the Melbourne police are set forth including false arrests, fabricated confessions and brutalising of arrestees. 134 Only one of these cases involved a search at all. 35 In that case the police, acting with reasonable suspicion but without a search warrant or in exigent circumstances, broke into a flat occupied by two suspects, pushed one of them out of a window to the street 30 feet below and brutalised him as he lay on the ground with broken limbs. Yet despite the obvious illegality of this search, the Board of Inquiry makes no mention of the fact that no warrant was obtained, but focuses instead on the subsequent police brutality. While this brutality was certainly the most important feature of the incident, it is still inconceivable that an American analysis of a similar incident would not point out, as a matter of first principle, the illegality of the warrantless entry.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As the cases discussed illustrate, and as Australians who have studied the system agree, "the 'law' of criminal investigation in Australia is in a totally unsatisfactory state." 36 Despite this recognition, however, neither of the two major models of reform, the Law Reform Commission reports on Criminal Investigation (1975) and Evidence (1987), recommends the adoption of the 129 (1986) 22 A Crim R 409. 130 In America, at least, hotel employees may not consent to the search of a particular room during the period in which it has been rented by a guest. [VOLUME 18
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American-style automatic exclusionary rule. 137 This is so despite the Law Reform Commission's recognition that "[r]ights without remedies may be no more than rhetoric" and their awareness of, and recommendation of, many other aspects of the American system.
Why is an automatic exclusionary rule rejected when, by providing a relatively certain sanction for rights violations, it should have the effect of deterring (or at least tending to deter) such police misconduct? 138 The answer given by the Law Reform Commission is instructive to Americans. They point out that "the American rule has its limits". 39 They point to the ways in which the United States Supreme Court has cabined the operation of the exclusionary rule:
An accused person cannot invoke the rule if the evidence was obtained in breach of another's rights. The rule does not apply to breaches by a private individual rather than a state official. It does not apply so as to prevent the presentation of illegally obtained evidence to a federal grand jury. And the rule does not apply where the evidence is admitted not on the issue of the accused's guilt but on some collateral issue such as his credibility as a witness. This kind of narrow distinction between evidence proving guilt and evidence proving that an accused who says he is not guilty is not worthy of belief as a witness tends to bring the law and lawyers into contempt.1
The above are exceptions to the 'automatic' exclusionary rule, and are cases where the rule does not operate despite concededly illegal police behaviour. The other way that the United States Supreme Court has mitigated the seeming harshness of a rule that automatically excludes evidence in case of a violation, is by loosening the definition of what constitutes a 'violation'.41 For example, the Court has frequently declared that
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.,1 42 137 LRC Criminal Investigation supra n 5 para 298; LRC Evidence supra n 8 para 164(a): "In the Commission's view, the policy concerns do not justify automatic exclusion. The policy concerns compete and operate with varying force depending on the circumstances of a particular case. The intention is one which a discretionary approach is the most appropriate • .. [But] . .. once misconduct has been established, the burden should rest on the prosecution to persuade the court that the evidence should be admitted". 138 M W Orfield, supra n 4 finding that the exclusionary rule does deter police search and seizure violations. 
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In fact, as I have previously pointed out, "these exceptions are neither few nor well-delineated". 143 There are over twenty such exceptions and "searches conducted pursuant to these exceptions, particularly searches incident to arrest, automobile and 'stop and frisk' searches, far exceed searches performed pursuant to warrant". 1 ' Thus, despite the 'warrant requirement', many searches conducted without a warrant are not 'illegal' and consequently, the exclusionary rule does not operate.
Of course, these kinds of exceptions are not necessarily inherent in a mandatory exclusionary rule. The Court could stick to a strict warrant requirement, and impose no 'standing' or 'use for impeachment purposes' limitations on the operation of the exclusionary rule, as the dissenting Justices have consistently urged. Clearly, the Court's reluctance to have a clearcut rule that always applies is due, as White J intimated, to the Justices' recognition that this will lead to an unacceptably high number of criminals going free because the police blundered.
Is a discretionary rule, then, the only honest answer? Certainly the discretionary rule currently practised in Australia, which is "often mentioned but rarely acted upon" 148 can hardly be considered an adequate safeguard to civil liberties. The Law Reform Commission's proposals to remedy this problem deserve serious consideration. They recommend that where the police have broken the rules in obtaining evidence, "the court shall not admit the evidence unless it is, on the balance of probabilities, satisfied (by the prosecution) 49 that admission of the evidence would specifically and substantially benefit the public interest without unduly prejudicing the rights and freedoms of any person". Factors to consider include the seriousness of the offence, the seriousness of the police misconduct and the extent to which the evidence in question might have been lawfully obtained. 150 A more recent Law Reform Commission report takes essentially the same view but deletes the 'substantially' provision, merely requiring that "the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of evidence that has been [illegally] obtained." It also adds other factors to consider including 143 C M Bradley, "Two Models of the Fourth Amendment" (1985) "the importance of the evidence in the proceeding" and "whether the impropriety . . . was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."
5 ' The more recent proposal also imposes quite stringent requirements on the use of admissions obtained during interrogation of persons "reasonably suspected" of crime, 52 declaring that they are "not admissible", (and would thus establish a mandatory exclusionary rule), unless the defendant is cautioned as to his right to silence and possible use of his statements against him and his admission is tape recorded.
153 Admissions "influenced by violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether toward the person who made the admission or toward some other person, or by a threat of conduct of that kind", are also (mandatorily) "not admissible".
54
Certainly the recommendations concerning confessional evidence seem highly desirable. They will largely eliminate police fabrication of confessional evidence while, at the same time, by putting confessions on tape, increase their value in the prosecution's case. Indeed, in my view videotaping of confessions, where practicable, would be an even more desirable requirement. 55 The one thing missing from their proposal, evidently left out Since both of these people were certainly 'reasonably suspected' of crime the proposed Australian rules would apply to them. It is not obvious to me that such a broad application is advisable, however. 153 LRC Evidence, supra n 8, Appendix A. Draft legislation s 74. If it was not reasonably practicable to have made such a recording of the actual admission, a recording of the suspect confirming the admission will suffice. The Commission report makes it clear at para 164(b) that signed records of interview are not a substitute for a tape recording despite a section in the Draft Legislation (s 75) which seems to suggest that they may be. The Review Committee on Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report (February 1989) recently proposed similar rules, requiring tape recording and cautions as to both right to silence and counsel, but imposing a mandatory exclusionary rule only on non-tape recorded statements: ibid para 85 F(2), 85(c)(1) and 85(T)(1).
A new Victorian statute, supra n 99 requires taping of any "confession or admission made to an investigating official by a person who was suspected or ought reasonably to have been suspected" of an "indictable offence" and provides, subject to exceptions, that unrecorded statements are "inadmissible". The statute further provides that a "person in custody" must be informed "that he or she does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be given in evidence" (s.464A(3)) and that such a person must be informed that he or she has a right to "communicate with a legal practitioner": s 464C(l). However 'custody' does not begin unless the defendant is actually arrested or "there is sufficient information in the possession of the investigating officer to justify [ in deference to, or in fear of, the police lobby, 156 is a limitation, similar to the former Victorian statute previously discussed, 57 on the amount of time a suspect can be held for questioning before being taken before a judge or magistrate. In my view, the maximum period should be six hours, extendable for six more hours by a judge or magistrate upon application by the police for good cause shown.
Currently, in America, once the courts are satisfied that the Miranda warnings have been given and that the statement has not been induced by force or threats, there is a tendency to ignore other concerns. Thus, as discussed, police falsely telling a suspect that his fingerprints have been found at the crime scene has been ignored by the Supreme Court 58 and the prompt arraignment requirement of Mallory v United States' 59 has never been extended to the states. Various police interrogation techniques designed to induce the defendant to confess, which were condemned by the Court in Miranda v Arizona'
6° are now, apparently, permitted, so long as the defendant receives the required warnings, though studies have shown that the warnings do little to discourage suspects from making damaging admissions to police. 161 Given that none but the most committed civil libertarian really wants to discourage criminal suspects from making admissions to the police, it seems sensible to focus on ensuring that such admissions are reproduced accurately in court, at least as much as whether they were made after warnings or in response to false promises. The proposed Bill achieves this in a way that American law does not.
The proposed discretionary exclusionary rule as to illegal seizures of evidence is more problematic. Certainly the Australian experience to date makes a compelling case against discretionary, and in favour of mandatory, exclusion 62 (although the current mandatory Australian rule against involuntary confessions also does not seem to be producing very consistent results). On the other hand, the American mandatory rule has led to the courts waffling, and hence to creating confusion, as to the rules which, if broken, require exclusion. This much can be said for a non-mandatory rule: as a matter of deterrence, it is surely not necessary to exclude evidence every time the police err. If the police knew that the evidence would be excluded for say two-thirds of the time, they would probably be just as deterred from illegal searches as they are now. The trouble with this approach is that it has to be random. Otherwise, whatever the standards, the police will learn them and adjust their conduct accordingly. Thus a standard, as proposed by the Law Reform Commission, of considering the seriousness of the case will tend to have little or no deterrent effect in serious cases because the police will know in advance that almost anything they do will not lead to loss of evidence. It is hard to imagine that merely shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution will cause judges, who have never, or virtually never, excluded evidence on the basis of an illegal search, to suddenly begin doing so with enough regularity to ensure police compliance with the rules.
As a supplement to its discretionary rule, the Law Reform Commission urges the creation of an external police review board to discipline the police for rights violations. 63 The Commission believes that the combination of this board and its discretionary exclusionary remedy will cause the rules of criminal procedure to be "taken very seriously indeed".1 64 I disagree, for two reasons. First, it is highly doubtful that convicted criminals or their lawyers will be motivated to bring, and be successful if they do bring actions before such a board. Such a board seems most useful as a supplement to a mandatory exclusionary rule, to vindicate the rights of innocent people aggrieved by police misconduct, rather than as a substitute for such a rule. Secondly, it seems unlikely that the police department, not facing loss of evidence due to officers' misconduct, would take the disciplinary recommendations of such a board very seriously. As Professor Amsterdam has observed:
Realistically, no extra-departmental body has the information, resources and direct disciplinary authority necessary to control the police effectively and consistently. 165 Consequently, I urge mandatory exclusion, despite its problems, as the only remedy likely to deter police misconduct. If one has a standard of forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, as Australia clearly does, then it makes no sense to say to the police -'Well, you weren't supposed to have conducted this search because you lacked reasonable grounds (for example), but, since you did it, well allow you the full benefit of the evidence. But don't do it again!' It is not the exclusionary rule, but the prohibition against unreasonable searches that forbids the use of the evidence. When such illegally seized evidence is offered in court, it is incumbent upon the judge to refuse it. This is necessary, as the High Court has recognised, in order to "discourage the use of unacceptable methods" by the police. 166 Only when a penalty is consistently attached to police rights violations will such discouragement occur. The American experience has shown, moreover, that police can learn to follow the rules in most cases such that evidence need not be excluded very often in order to enforce the rules. One survey of studies showed that the rule results in the non-prosecution or non-conviction of between 0.69 per cent and 2.35 per cent of individuals arrested for felonies, 67 despite the fact that the American 'rules' can be bafflingly complicated. If the police in America were given straightforward statutory rules that a policeman of ordinary conscientiousness and ability could follow, the rate of evidentiary exclusion would surely drop even more. The Australian Law Reform Commission has achieved this in the confessions area with essentially, two simple commands to the police: (i) caution all suspects and (ii) tape record all statements. 68 In the search area, the problem is not so much the rules, but the failure to enforce them. The New South Wales statutory scheme previously discussed 69 sets forth fairly clearly the obligations of the police as to searches and seizures. 170 I cannot believe that violations do not occur and urge that these be discouraged by a consistent policy of evidentiary suppression (especially in cases where no warrant was obtained). Still, I believe that, in part, the absence of case law in the search and seizure area may be due to the existence and clarity of the statutory rules. If similar rules can be adopted and enforced as to confessions, Australia will have gone far down the road to achieving the dual goals of the criminal justice systemapprehension of the guilty while protecting individual rights.
If, however, history repeats itself and the Commonwealth and State Parliaments fail to act then it is up to the High Court, acting as in Ireland under the authority of the common law or, on the basis of a statutory violation, to fill the breach and ensure police observance of traditional human rights by commanding the courts to refuse to admit evidence obtained in the violation of those rights or of statutory mandates. all confessions' and by adding a third requirement that suspects not be held for questioning more than six hours without the approval of a judicial officer. 169 Supra n 19. 170 One problem with the NSW statute is that it fails to limit police searches incident to arrest, which, under the common law, extends to the entire house of the arrestee. Gillies, supra [VOLUME 18
Enforcing the Rules of Criminal Procedure is to continue to claim that its citizens have rights with respect to the police, then it must back up that claim with remedies for rights violations. 
